Liberal and democratic systems are growingly experiencing an authoritarian regression, even when they follow legal electoral and institutional procedures. This is what is happening in Trump’s America and in many other countries, from Turkey to Hungary. The way to avoid an authoritarian drift is for both citizens and political leaders to be alert to the danger in time and to act accordingly.

This talk will argue that the foundations of institutions that protect individual liberty and create an environment conducive to economic growth are not in clever institutional designs or top-down development of state institutions. Rather, they emerge from the involvement of society in politics in a way that balances the power of state institutions and elites. This precarious balance, when it is achieved, unleashes a powerful process of building of state capacity and development of society's capability to institutionalize its involvement in politics. The corridor leading to such institutions is narrow because of the difficulty of creating this balance and staying the course despite myriad conflicts and gridlocks.

We study preferences for protectionism in response to unemployment resulting from different types of labor market shocks. These include technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.

The specter of populism is haunting the world. But what is it exactly? Where does it come from and what should be done about it? We define populism as an anti-elitist exclusionary political strategy which builds a coalition of discontented citizens to challenge the status-quo. To understand why this coalition is potentially destabilizing to democracy and how it forms we developed a framework to studying the joint evolution of state and society.

This lecture assesses what has so far been accomplished in terms of decarbonisation and energy efficiency improvements and compares this to what will be needed to prevent further warming of the earth about 2 degrees C. The structural transformation required to reduce carbon emissions in line with the IPCC target is profound, and, as will be argued, cannot be left to markets, private initiative and/or pecuniary nudges. A green industrial policy might accomplish this, but it will have to overcome powerful tendencies towards dual economies in the world's most advanced economies.

Globalization has been blamed in the last thirty years for many economic ills, including the rise of inequality. I will discuss the findings of a large body of work on the impact of globalization on inequality. Research does not confirm many popular views.

There are profound reasons why the public misunderstands economics in predictable ways, rooted in the mismatch between our human cognitive endowment and economic analysis. This impacts public policy everywhere, but especially when populists control the economy, as their self-presentation as one with “the people” compels them to embrace simplistic views that resonate with those of the lay public.

The political landscape in Europe has changed dramatically over the recent years. In many countries, right-wing parties have strongly increased their vote shares, often at the expense of social democrats. To which extent is this driven by globalization – in particular, by the extent and composition of recent immigrant flows, and by exposure to international trade and shrinking manufacturing sectors? I discuss arguments put forth in the recent literature and present results from own research that sheds light on these and related issues.

Politics in the early 21st is characterized by the rise of populism, in which “the people” are pitted against “the elite,” but what explains the rise of populist parties and what are the consequences of populist politics?

How does one's' political-economic environment shape aspirations and choices? Decisions are generally made within a specific set of social norms, rules, values and world views. We study how, during the German Reunification, convergence with West Germany influenced the educational aspirations and eventual educational investments of students in the East.

Over the last 65 years there has been a large rise in the share of Muslims in the world population and a decline in the share of Christians, but the big story is not one about the former growing at the expense of the latter, since the movement in their relative shares reflects almost entirely the different demographics of the populations in which the two religions were more strongly implanted at the beginning of the postwar era. Instead, the story is about local and folk religions all over the world being replaced by organisations representing one of the two major global religious identities. This lecture will look at how religions compete with each other in the global and local marketplaces.

Populist foreign policies pursued recently by President Trump, British Brexiteers, and leaders of other European democracies have produced surprisingly little real policy change. Populist rhetoric generally proves to be incompatible with pursuit of the national interest in a globalized world. On most issues, populist governments choose to break their foreign policy promises in order to stay in office.

All over Europe, the populist right has taken hold through some shared ideas, such as the rejection of immigrants and of the free circulation of goods and assets, and the opposition to supranational institutions. The consequence of their success, though, may be very different in each country, depending on the steadiness of their liberal and democratic systems. The question arises whether a threat to democracy can be transformed in a democratic corrective.

The unemployment figures hide dramatic statistics regarding underemployment, underpaid work and jobs of a few hours. Young people and the less educated are increasingly underemployed, while immigrants are erroneously blamed for this worsening in the quality of work. What can be done to change this situation?

In South America, the Right and the Left are similar in their glorification the Pueblo, like Perón did in the past and Chavez and Maduro today. A central role is played by the caudillo, the charismatic leader who with masterly manipulation of words constructs his own “truth”, uses public resources at his discretion, keeps his supporters continuously mobilised against “external” enemies, despises legality and undermines the roots of liberal institutions.

The question of whether industrialized economies can continue to grow has been discussed in the past ten years, as growth rates have slowed down. Some economists have argued that the advanced economies are doomed to secular stagnation and that growth at high rates is over for good. This is examined in view of economic history and the determinants of past economic growth.

I will survey three economic history literatures that can speak to contemporary challenges to globalization, including Brexit and the election of Donald Trump: the literature on the anti-globalization backlash of the nineteenth century, focused largely on trade and migration; the literature on the Great Depression, focused largely on capital flows, the gold standard, and protectionism; and the literature on trade and warfare.

La combinazione di conflitti estesi e prolungati, le conseguenti migrazioni forzate su larga scala, le nuove sfide rispetto al diritto d’asilo, il divario tra le risorse economiche e i bisogni umanitari, e la crescente xenofobia hanno generato una miscela esplosiva. Cosa può fare l'UNHCR, cosa possono fare i governi nazionali e quelli locali, a partire dalle città. Il parere dell’Alto Commissario delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati.

Senza un’opinione pubblica europea è difficile pensare a una unione politica. Per crearla sono necessari scambi tra i media nazionali ma anche la creazione di luoghi di informazione, analisi e discussione transnazionali. C’è una nuova generazione che si sente europea e che cerca informazioni critiche e selezionate. A questa generazione apparteneva Antonio Megalizzi.

Il conflitto tra i pochi e i molti può essere l’ossigeno della libertà politica e civile. Soprattutto se – come sosteneva Machiavelli – all’interno di un “buon ordine”, i molti affamati di sicurezza controllano i pochi affamati di potere.

Le élite liberali che hanno governato l’Occidente negli ultimi trent’anni hanno commesso molti errori: sottovalutazione delle disuguaglianze, utilizzo della competenza tecnica come sostitutiva della rappresentanza politica, fede nelle capacità redistributive del libero mercato, sbagliate politiche migratorie.

Negli ultimi decenni la globalizzazione del mercato non si è accompagnata all’universalismo dei diritti umani e sociali. Una divaricazione che ha favorito l’affermazione di populismo e nazionalismo e che ha rimesso in questione distinzioni consolidate, a partire da quella tra destra e sinistra.

Perché in tutto l’Occidente le classi lavoratrici si sono spostate a destra? Apertura dei mercati, società multietnica, rivoluzioni tecnologiche, vincoli esteri e di bilancio: le ragioni del divorzio della sinistra dal suo popolo raccontate a partire dalle esperienze di un inviato in Europa, Cina e Usa.

Il reddito di base incondizionato si differenzia dall’assistenza sociale – incluso il reddito di cittadinanza italiano – in tre aspetti: è prettamente individuale, non si basa sul reddito di partenza e nemmeno sull’occupazione del beneficiario. La fattibilità politica di tale proposta richiede una qualche forma di nazionalismo? E la globalizzazione ne mina la sostenibilità economica?